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7 May 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: Suggestions for Agenda of Meeting of  
National Psychological Strategy Board  
Scheduled for 11 am, Tuesday, 8 May 1951

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1. Confirming your oral request to me of 4 May 1951, I am submitting this memorandum for your consideration prior to the National Psychological Strategy Board meeting which is scheduled to take place in the office of the Director next Tuesday morning. I am setting forth in this memorandum a number of items for possible inclusion in the agenda for this meeting and also a certain amount of discussion of some of these items. In the discussion I have combined my own thoughts with certain ideas of Col. Johnston and have drawn upon a memorandum which he prepared in April 1950, at which time there was under consideration the creation of a new staff to implement the recently adopted NSC 68.

2. Proposed agenda items:

a. Selection of the Executive Director. If no decision has been reached as to an appropriate person to hold this very important post, I think there might be a discussion of names and qualifications.

b. Discussion of appropriate staff or staffs to serve the Board. It is my own view that there should be a small highly-qualified, full-time regular staff serving under the Executive Director, and in addition, a panel of consultants or advisors which would consist of rather senior representatives of the various departments and agencies primarily concerned. These concepts will be more fully discussed in a later paragraph.

c. Discussion of the distinctions between and the relationship of the NPSB and the existing (recently renamed) Psychological Operations Coordinating Board (the Barrett Board). It should be brought out in this discussion that the new Board is not merely a higher level psychological and propaganda warfare board but is rather a board which will make important policy determinations and plans for all major aspects of the cold-war situation. The functions of the new

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NPSB are readily distinguished from those of the Barrett Board, which should continue to discharge important functions in the field of coordinating psychological warfare operations. In my view the Barrett Board would not be concerned with high-level policy decisions and long-range plans but would concentrate on the week-to-week and even the day-to-day execution of plans in the psychological warfare field.

d. There should be a discussion of the unresolved questions of policy, planning, and the provision of guidance in the economic warfare field. This is the red-headed step-child of the cold-war effort, and to my knowledge no provision has been made for obtaining resolution of policy questions and guidance to operators in the economic warfare field.

e. Discussion of the physical location and quarters for the NPSB. Where will the new activity be housed? In view of the appointment of General Smith as chairman of the Board, there might be some disposition to suggest that the Board should be housed by CIA. Although such a conclusion would have numerous practical benefits in the sense of making life easier for the Director and those others within CIA who may have responsibilities in connection with the Board, it is my opinion that the Board should be set up in quarters outside of CIA and that the quarters should be commensurate in quality with the hoped-for dignity and importance of the Board. The Board will be out in the open and will be a meeting place for many kinds of people who we would prefer not to have roaming around within CIA premises, and moreover I think it would be a mistake to give the Board a too heavy CIA coloration, for many reasons.

3. Under point b above, I made reference to the desirability of having two different kinds of "staffs." I think that a permanent staff of highly-qualified individuals is necessary if the work of the Board is to progress effectively. If the staff is composed of representatives of the various departments and agencies concerned, serving in a part-time and representative capacity, it could not possibly be called a staff. It would become a junior council rather than a staff and, if it should attempt to perform staff functions, it would find that it would be inhibited by its representative nature. The work of such a "staff" would have too great a tendency toward compromises between conflicting representative interests rather than the development of general

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solutions from the standpoint of overall national interests. In my opinion such a group is needed in order to backstop and support the senior members of the Board and to furnish full and more continuous liaison to their respective departments and agencies, but it should be separate from the regular staff. Such a group of junior representatives could well include the persons already having responsibility in the cold-war field within their respective departments and agencies, such as General Magruder and Admiral Stevens for the Department of Defense and the JCS respectively. I think the State Department should be represented by Mr. Barrett or his deputy and in addition by a strong representative from the political side, perhaps Mr. Matthews or Mr. Perkins. I would recommend that there be an attempt to infuse some new blood into this organism by the addition of other good minds from State, Defense, and CIA - having in mind such persons as Tracy Barnes from the Department of the Army.

The permanent full-time staff should, as stated above, be comprised of a small number of highly-qualified individuals. This staff should include experts in planning and coordinating interdepartmental operations. There might be a program group consisting of generalists for (1) planning and policy development, (2) coordination of program implementation, and (3) continuing program review, analysis, and reporting. In addition there might be a functional staff of specialists for political warfare, psychological warfare, military strategy and operations, and unconventional forms of military and paramilitary activity. I would recommend the inclusion of an economic warfare specialist within this functional staff, even though the Board may not be charged with specific responsibilities in the economic warfare field. (The reason for this recommendation is twofold; viz, there is constant overlapping, and it has proved to be impossible to establish clear-cut distinctions between economic warfare and various other types of cold war operations; and secondly, as a partial remedy for the unsatisfactory situation resulting from the fact that CIA (OPC) has never been able to find any governmental body either capable of or willing to assume the responsibility for providing guidance in the economic warfare field.) In the manning of such a staff, it will probably turn out that the best source of qualified personnel will be within the departments and agencies of the Government, and it may be necessary to insist on the provision of good men from Defense, State, CIA, etc.,

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for without such insistence the best individuals will not be provided and if they are not provided, the staff will not be strong enough to support the Board.



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